Across Nigeria and indeed Africa many well-intentioned energy projects continue to struggle or collapse, not necessarily because renewable energy does not work, but because of avoidable gaps in project design, implementation, and long-term management. The Bayero University Kano (BUK) solar project is, unfortunately, not an isolated case.
These failures are costly. They erode public confidence, waste scarce public funds, and slow down the energy transition we so urgently need.
The BUK project offers a timely case study.
Project Background
In 2019, the Federal Government commissioned a 3–3.5 MW solar hybrid power plant at Bayero University Kano under the Energising Education Programme. At the time, it was celebrated as one of the largest off-grid solar installations in Africa, designed to power lecture theatres, laboratories, hostels, offices, and staff quarters reducing dependence on diesel and the national grid.
By 2020, barely a year after commissioning, the plant began to develop faults. By early 2021, it had largely shut down.
Several issues were identified in the subsequent media investigation. The purpose of this article is not to criticise government or any institution, but to draw out practical lessons for energy project development and implementation, using the BUK experience as a learning tool.
Now to the learning points:
1. Improper Energy Audit and System Design
One of the clearest issues identified was that the energy needs of the university were underestimated. A staff source noted that the system was constantly strained because demand exceeded what the plant was designed to support. This goes to the heart of energy project development.
A proper energy audit and load assessment is non-negotiable. Once design assumptions are wrong whether on demand growth, peak loads, usage patterns, or diversity factors, very other part of the project becomes vulnerable. No amount of high-quality equipment can compensate for a fundamentally flawed design.
Energy projects must be based on robust, forward-looking audits, not just present demand, but be tailored to accommodate future expansion, behavioral changes, and worst-case scenarios. When design fails, the entire system is set up to crumble.
2. Weak Operational and Maintenance Planning
The plant reportedly developed faults in 2020. Faults, in themselves, are not unusual, every technical system experience them. The real issue was that the faults were not fixed early, allowing minor problems to escalate into system-wide failure by 2021.
This highlights a recurring weakness in public energy projects: maintenance is treated as an afterthought. Solar infrastructure is not “install and forget.” Inverters, control systems, cabling, and protection devices require continuous monitoring, preventive maintenance, and rapid response when issues arise.
A credible operations and maintenance (O&M) framework, backed by funding, skilled personnel, and clear response timelines, is just as important as the initial capital expenditure.
3. Overuse, Abuse, and Poor User Orientation
Reports indicated that faults worsened after students returned and “abused” the system. While the term may sound informal, it points to a serious issue.
Every energy system is designed to meet specific usage parameters. When users are not properly educated or when systems are not technically constrained to prevent misuse overloading becomes inevitable.
Project implementation must therefore include user education, operational rules, and technical safeguards that make misuse difficult or impossible. Orientation is not optional—it is part of system design.
4. Lack of Adequate Storage and System Resilience
The BUK plant was a hybrid system but reportedly lacked sufficient storage capacity, limiting reliability and resilience.
While not all solar projects require extensive battery storage, the context matters. A university campus with night-time academic activities, hostels, laboratories, and administrative functions may require stronger storage or redundancy planning.
This again points back to design choice System architecture must be context-specific, balancing cost, reliability, resilience, and usage patterns. Storage decisions should not be generic.
5. Limited Stakeholder and Local Technical Involvement
Another critical issue was the apparent lack of technical involvement of the university in project implementation and maintenance.
When projects are executed by external contractors—often foreign—without structured knowledge transfer, training, and local capacity building, sustainability suffers. Small faults become major failures simply because no one on ground is empowered to act.
This problem was compounded by reported security concerns, which allegedly prevented original engineers from returning to fix faults.
Indeed, every energy project must embed local capacity, mandatory training, and knowledge transfer. Contracts should clearly address O&M responsibilities, remote support obligations, and contingencies for security or access challenges.
6. Rising Repair Costs and Poor Lifecycle Planning
Inflation and rising costs reportedly made spare parts and repairs unaffordable over time. By the time action was considered, replacement costs had escalated. This highlights the danger of focusing only on upfront project delivery, without proper lifecycle planning.
Energy contracts should anticipate spare parts replacement, pricing frameworks, and long-term maintenance costs. Projects must be financially sustainable beyond commissioning.
7. Depreciation from Prolonged Downtime
Once the plant shut down, components deteriorated further due to inactivity, an issue common with electrical and electronic systems. This reinforces a simple truth: systems decay faster when abandoned. There is no gainsaying that downtime is expensive. Preventive maintenance and early intervention are always cheaper than revival and should be imbibed.
Final Reflection
The impact of the breakdown is that the university had to return to diesel generators and higher energy cost disrupting academic and commercial activities
It is encouraging that the Rural Electrification Agency (REA) plans to revive and expand the plant. However, revival must go hand-in-hand with institutional learning from the previous breakdown
The BUK solar project did not fail because solar energy does not work. It struggled because end-to-end project thinking was incomplete.
Energy projects are ecosystems made up technical, financial, human, contractual, and operational players. When any link is weak, things fall apart.
The real opportunity now is to ensure that these lessons are not just applied at BUK, but across every energy project in Nigeria and Africa, so that billions invested do not go to waste over issues that are entirely preventable.
